jueves, 30 de marzo de 2017

Ecuador's Macroeconomic Alternative Facts: Debunking the Distorted Analysis of 50+ Economists

Carlos Uribe-Teran and Pablo Vega-Garcia
Professors of Economics, School of Economics and Institute of Economics, Universidad San Francisco de Quito

In this post we refute the imprecise and false macroeconomic statements (or the so-called “alternative facts”) presented in the post written by Ha-Joon Chang and James K. Galbraith and signed by other 50+ economists that was published on March 26th, 2017 at CommonDreams. The goal of this post is to provide a simple but rigorous analysis to try to eliminate the misinformation and correct the distorted view of Ecuador’s economy presented in that post.

In particular, we focus on four “alternative facts” mentioned in that post regarding the following aspects of Ecuador’s economy: 1) the impact of oil prices in the economy’s performance, 2) the role of the central bank in the economy, 3) the fiscal policy cyclicality, and 4) the economic growth rate for selected periods. 

Alternative Fact 1, from Chang and Galbraith post: It has all but become conventional wisdom that the economic and social progress in Ecuador, such as it is recognized, resulted simply from a commodities boom and a spike in oil revenues. This explanation ignores the innovative and important reforms that the Ecuadorian government has enacted that have played an instrumental role and allowed the country to emerge, relatively unscathed, from the 2009 Global Recession and the more recent collapse in oil prices”.

Claiming that Ecuador’s economic progress as a result of the spike in oil prices is just conventional wisdom is an understatement. Claiming that the last collapse in oil prices (starting on the second half of 2014) left Ecuador’s economy unscathed denotes an absolute ignorance of Ecuador’s reality and also of the data. During Correa’s administration, oil prices explain not only Ecuador’s economic growth but also the economic downturns. The correlation between real GDP growth and oil prices during that period is 0.94. In contrast, between 2001 and 2006 the correlation falls to 0.27. Graph 1 shows the real GDP growth and the WTI price from 2001 to 2016.

It is also important to note that the collapse in oil prices in 2008-2009 and in 2014-2016 resulted in a severe slowdown of the economy in 2009 and in a deep recession in 2015 and 2016. This is not only clear from the data. Taxi drivers, hairstylists, owners of small, medium, and large businesses or even the informal sector could also date the beginning of the current recession within months after the collapse in oil prices and provide further evidence of how unscathed this collapse has left Ecuadorians.

Graph 1. Annual Real GDP Growth and Oil Prices, 2001-2016

Note: The shadowed area corresponds to Correa’s presidency. Data for 2016 include up to the 3rd quarter. Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.

Alternative Fact 2. From Chang and Galbraith postThis explanation ignores the innovative and important reforms that the Ecuadorian government has enacted […]. These reforms included bringing the central bank into the government’s economic team, […]”.

The central bank involvement consisted of lending resources to the government in the amount of about US$5,300 million between 2014 and March 2017, coinciding with the collapse in oil prices beginning the second half of 2014. This amount represents about 63% of the central bank’s liabilities and about 5% of GDP. Graph 2 shows the evolution of this credit to the government. Weisbrot, Johnston, and Merling (2017), which this post also references, refer to this policy as “innovative and surprising” (page 15). What is surprising is that anyone would call this “quantitative easing”—it is not. It is the central bank funding government deficits. The government uses these funds on a weekly basis as a line of credit. Therefore, this “policy” does not have any impact on the interest rate, which is actually controlled by the government. It is not even innovative since other countries have attempted this in the past. Argentina implemented similar policies in the second half of the 19th century that ended with the decapitalization of the government’s bank and the abandonment of the gold standard (see Della Paolera and Taylor, 2001).

Graph 2. Ecuadors Central Bank Credit to the Government, January 2006-March 2017

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.

A more accurate description of what is really happening with the central bank is the following. The two main sources of funds of Ecuador´s Central Bank are i) the required reserves from the banking sector and ii) deposits from local governments and public companies, which are obligated to deposit in the central bank. Graph 3 shows the evolution of these two types of deposits (“bank reserves” and “public sector deposits”), which are a liability for the central bank, and the dollar reserves backing these obligations (“international reserves”). As graph 3 shows, since the end of 2009 the gap between these liabilities and the international reserves has been widening. Currently, only 38% of the central bank obligations are backed up with liquid assets. Even more worrisome is the fact that since January 2016 the international reserves are not even enough to cover the required reserves associated with bank deposits. As of March 24th, 2017 only 81% of these reserves were covered. Additionally, due to the low level of coverage reached in May 2016, the government recapitalized the central bank with new borrowing from China in May ($1,500 million), and tapped international financial markets four times (in August, September and December 2016, and January 2017) totaling $3,750 million. These international bonds pay interests between 9% and 10.75% and have maturities of 5 and 10 years. Thus, this practice goes against the Central Bank’s mission, represents a breach of its contract with society, and is not a prudent management of the Central Bank balance sheet. In a dollarized economy the only monetary tool that should be available for the central bank is the required reserve ratio. Lending money that belongs to people, companies, or local governments (which ultimately belongs to people) to the central government is a risky and irresponsible practice since it puts the dollarization regime under threat.

In conclusion, “bringing the central bank into the government’s economic team’ does not seem a measure of success as much as it is a reason to worry. In fact, one of the causes of Ecuador’s1999 crisis was the participation of the central bank in the government’s economic team. 

Graph 3. Central Bank Obligations and International Reserves, January 2006-March 2017

Source: Central Bank of Ecuador.

Alternative Fact 3: “This explanation ignores the innovative and important reforms that the Ecuadorian government has enacted […]. These reforms included […], countercyclical fiscal policy”.

Arguing that Correa’s administration has implemented countercyclical fiscal policy could not be further from the truth. Empirical evidence shows that the last ten years have been one of the most pro-cyclical fiscal periods in Ecuador over the past 50 years. We prove this by examining the cyclicality of government expenditure (see Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) for a detailed discussion of why this variable can be useful when analyzing fiscal cyclicality). 

We present both cycles for the period 2007:Q1 - 2016:Q3 in graph 4A. As it can be seen, the government spending cycle almost perfectly matches the economic cycle. It increases during expansionary periods and declines during slowdowns. In fact, the correlation between these two series is 0.51 (vs. -0.00 for the period 2000:Q1 - 2006:Q4). Additionally, we test the statistical significance of this result by running an OLS regression of both cyclical components. The specification of this regression is as follows
cycle log(government expenditure) =α+β* cycle log(real GDP),

where β is our parameter of interest. A positive β means that fiscal policy is pro-cyclical. 

Our estimation shows that the coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant, proving that the statement that fiscal policy in Ecuador has been countercyclical is absolutely false. Graph 4B) shows the scattered plot with the data and the estimated regression and Table 1 presents the results of our estimation and the correlation coefficient for Correa’s administration, the period before Correa’s term during dollarization (i.e., 2000-2006), and the decade before dollarization (i.e., 1990-1999). In all the subsamples the conclusion is that fiscal policy has always been pro-cyclical, but even more so while Correa has been in office.

Graph 4A: Cyclical components of government expenditure and real GDP from 2007:Q1 to 2016:Q3

Graph 4B: OLS fitting of cyclical components of government expenditure and real GDP from 2007:Q1 to 2016:Q3

Note: We use quarterly data of government expenditure and real GDP filtered with the HP filter after taking logarithms for the period 1965:Q1 to 2016:Q3. Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and Gachet et al. (2011).

Table 1: Correlation coefficients and OLS estimations for the relation between the cyclical components of government expenditure and real GDP.

1980:Q1 to 1999:Q4
2000:Q1 to 2006:Q4
2007:Q1 to 2016:Q3
OLS Coeff.
Note: *** indicates that the estimate is significant at 1%, ** indicates that the estimate is significant at 5%.

Alternative Fact 4: from Chang and Galbraith postCompared to 1.5 percent annual per capita GDP growth from 2006 to 2016, per capita GDP growth averaged just 0.6 percent from 1980 to 2006. From 1980 to 2000, a period during which Ecuador had a number of loan agreements with the International Monetary Fund, Ecuador experienced a considerable economic failure, as GDP per capita fell by 1.5 percent over those two decades. This failure almost certainly resulted at least in part from the neoliberal policies of cutting spending, privatization, inflation-targeting, deregulation, and others that also made the Ecuadorian economy increasingly vulnerable to external shocks. In the 1960–1980 period, by contrast, per capita GDP growth was 110 percent.”

We need to point out two limitations in this analysis. First and most importantly, arbitrarily choosing the period from 1980 to 2006 generates a bias in the average growth rate since Ecuador dollarized its economy in 2000, which represents a major structural break in any economic series. Second, although Correa won the election in 2006, he took office on January 15th, 2007, so Correa’s government started in 2007 and will finish in May 2017.

Instead of using annual data as Chang and Galbraith do, we use quarterly GDP data for the period 1965:Q1 to 2016:Q3 to calculate the average annual growth rate of total and GDP per capita. We study five periods: Correa’s administration which is defined between 2007:Q1 and 2016:Q3; the period post-dollarization before Correa took office, between 2000:Q1 and 2006:Q3; the decades before dollarization between 1980:Q1 and 1999:Q4; and finally, we also compute the annual average growth rate from 1965:Q1 to 1980:Q4; and from 1980:Q1 to 2006:Q4. Table 2 presents our results.

Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rates for selected periods
Average Annual Growth of GDP (%)
Average Annual Growth of GDP per capita (%)
Correa’s administration
2000:Q1 to 2006:Q4
1980:Q1 to 1999:Q4
1965:Q1 to 1980:Q4
1980:Q1 to 2006:Q4
Note: We assumed that population remains constant through the year to compute quarterly GDP per capita. Source: Central Bank of Ecuador and Gachet et al. (2011). Population data was taken from the World Bank.

Interestingly, the average GDP per capita growth rate during the period 2000-2006 (during dollarization and right before Correa’s administration) was larger (2.76%) than that of Correa’s term (1.89%). This result is robust when considering total GDP instead (4.52% from 2000:Q1-2006:Q4 and 3.42% during Correa’s administration). It is also important to point out that oil prices and revenue during 2000:Q1 to 2006:Q4 were much lower than those during Correa’s administration, suggesting that Correa´s Revolucion Ciudadana fell short in producing economic growth through government intervention, even in the presence of extraordinary revenue flows.

The authors also mention that the fall in GDP per capita from 1980 to 2000 is explained entirely by the loan agreements with the IMF, disregarding other significant exogenous shocks to the economy. In this regard, it cannot be ignored that on March 5th 1987 two major earthquakes hit Ecuador resulting in 1,000 deaths and collapsing the oil infrastructure. This translated into a GDP contraction of 15.8% (13.7% in per capita terms) in that year, the lowest growth rate registered since 1965. Additionally, in the period 1997-1998 Ecuador suffered the effects of El Fenomeno del Nino. By no means do we pretend to explain the negative growth from 1980 to 2000 as a consequence of these two natural disasters, but it is something that should be considered or at least mentioned in a rigorous analysis.

Concluding Remarks

We have provided simple but conclusive evidence that in the last 10 years Ecuador’s economic performance depended greatly on oil prices, fiscal policy has been pro-cyclical, the involvement of the central bank in the economy is putting the dollarization regime at risk, and that during the dollarization period the largest economic growth was achieved between 2000-2006, not during  Correa’s administration. All of these conclusions are the exact opposite to those presented in Chang and Galbraith’s post and signed by other 50+ economists.

We finally would like to highlight with this post that economic analysis should be done with more professional rigor even when it is published in blogs. When describing stylized facts such as the ones in the CommonDreams post, the economic analysis should at least attempt to eliminate the ideological veil. For another critique to some of the similar conclusions drawn in Chang and Galbraith post see Manuel Gonzalez post.

Finally, we have sent an email with the link to this post to Chang and Galbraith, as well as to the 50+ economists signing the post (or the one’s for whom we found their emails). We have offered them the opportunity to respond through comments in this blog. We will publish all the comments that they may have, or if they require more space, we will be happy to publish in our blog any posts related to these issues.

Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Lorena Castellanos, Luis Espinosa, Santiago José Gangotena, Melissa Paredes, Pablo Lucio Paredes, Mónica Rojas, and Pedro Romero for their excellent comments and suggestions.

Note: We found a coding mistake that drove us to make a mistake in the calculations of the level of pro-cyclicality of government expenditure. In the current text we have corrected this. Although the correlation coefficient is significantly lower (down from 0.93 to 0.51), the conclusions remain the same. 


Gachet I., Maldonado D., Oliva N., and Ramirez J., “Stylized Facts of the Ecuadorian Economy: The Economic Cycle 1965-2008”. Munich Personal RePEc Archive manuscript (2011).

Kaminsky, Graciela L., Carmen M. Reinhart, and Carlos A. Végh. "When it rains, it pours: procyclical capital flows and macroeconomic policies." NBER macroeconomics annual 19 (2004): 11-53.

Paolera, Gerardo della, and Alan M. Taylor. "Straining at the Anchor." National Bureau of Economic Research Books (2001).

Weisbrot, Mark, Mark Johnston, and Lara Merling. “Decade of Reform: Ecuador’s Macroeconomic Policies, Institutional Changes, and Results.” Center for Economic and Policy Research (February 2017).

miércoles, 29 de marzo de 2017

¿Los subsidios benefician a la economía ecuatoriana?

Todos los años el Fisco debe asumir un egreso importante como consecuencia de los subsidios. En el año 2015 el estado ecuatoriano, destinó $6000 millones del presupuesto público para este gasto, y para el 2016, disminuyó a $3193 millones. La reducción se produjo debido principalmente a la reducción en las transferencias a la seguridad social al eliminar un monto fijo asignado al IESS, rubro que pasó a un libro de deuda. Este monto puede ser reclamado al Estado por la seguridad social cuando sea necesitado. Uno de los rubros más importantes dentro de este egreso, es el subsidio destinado a los derivados del petróleo. El año pasado, el Fisco presupuestó $1888 millones para este tipo de subsidios. Es importante recalcar que los subsidios no están bien asignados ya que las personas beneficiadas de esta transferencia deberían ser, solamente, aquellas que tienen baja capacidad de consumo de ciertos bienes y servicios que son imprescindibles para su bienestar. Es por esta razón que el subsidio debe ser focalizado a cierto grupo económico, y no debe ser entregado como pago por un compromiso político.
Por otro lado, el problema radica también, en la forma en la que se financian los subsidios, ya que para esto, el gobierno requiere recursos que tienen que provenir ya sea de impuestos o por deuda pública. Cuando se financian vía impuestos, estos actúan como un desincentivo para la producción o el consumo. Por otro lado, cuando las transferencias se financian con deuda pública, el estado aquiere un compromiso que debe ser pagado en el mediano o largo plazo disminuyendo el consumo futuro.
Si bien el subsidio ha sido mal destinado y utilizado con segundas intenciones, el costo político de eliminarlo o reducirlo es bastante alto, razón por la cual se debería educar a la población tanto sobre las ventajas como las desventajas del mismo y a su vez buscar compensaciones que deberían estar incorporadas dentro de un plan económico con el objetivo de disminuir el peso político de la eliminación de los subsidios.
El candidato del oficialismo en una actitud completamente demagógica ha ofertado en su campaña política, incrementar el Bono de Desarrollo Humano a $150. Esto implica un incremento en el Gasto Público de al menos 700 millones de dólares anuales adicionales. La pregunta es: ¿cómo piensa financiar este incremento? Si lo hace vía impuestos estaría desincentivando aún más la producción y el consumo y si lo hace vía deuda pública estaría cayendo en un acto irresponsable de transferir el peso a las generaciones futuras.

lunes, 6 de marzo de 2017


Pablo Lucio-Paredes

Uno de los temas interesantes de la economía es el ciclo político, que básicamente nos dice: los gobiernos tratan de impulsar la política monetaria y fiscal (mayor déficit) unos meses antes de las elecciones para estimular la economía y ganar más votos en las urnas. Y esto es obviamente de actualidad en el país.
Como no hay almuerzo gratis en economía, esos excesos se pagan luego a través de mayor inflación/devaluación que obliga a los Bancos Centrales a intervenir y frenar el ciclo económico, o a través de mayor endeudamiento que en las siguientes fases obliga o a bajar el gasto público o a aumentar impuestos lo cual también es recesivo.

Si hacemos un cálculo del “valor presente” de los ciclos el resultado es neutro porque el empuje inicial antes de las elecciones se ve compensado con un freno posterior, pero incluso ese valor presente es probablemente negativo porque los ciclos  permanentes generan incertidumbre y desconfianza que disminuyen la tasa de crecimiento de tendencia (estas ideas resumidas en el cuadro adjunto).

¿Y qué ha pasado en el Ecuador en general, y más recientemente?
Tomemos un ejemplo del pasado, analizado por Jurgen Schuldt  en “Elecciones y Política Económica en el Ecuador 1983-1994 / ILDIS 1994”. El cuadro a continuación muestra la continua expansión de la política monetaria antes de las elecciones.

Para otro análisis más detallado recomiendo la lectura por ejemplo  de “Los ciclos políticos económicos en Ecuador: 1993-2010”. Paúl A. Carrillo.

¿Y en estos años? Este no es espacio para un análisis detallado, pero simplemente tomemos el déficit del SPNF en los últimos 8 años, trimestre tras trimestre, época en que se han dado 3 elecciones importantes, reelección de Rafael Correa en 2009 y en 2013, y ahora la elección del 2017. Como las elecciones en general son en el primer trimestre, el ciclo político del gasto fiscal debería iniciarse hacia el tercer y cuarto trimestre anterior. Recordemos que al estar el Ecuador dolarizado no existe una política monetaria directa que pueda ser utilizada, aunque el Banco Central desde inicios (pero sobre todo desde mediados) del 2016 ha utilizado el mecanismo de préstamos al Gobierno basado en el concepto de recirculación de liquidez.
Es difícil detectar (ver gráfico adjunto) un ciclo político per-se en el déficit fiscal porque hay tres tendencias muy claras que se superponen en Ecuador.
Uno, que el déficit fiscal es siempre mucho mayor en el último trimestre sobre todo porque se empujan gastos durante todo el año que deben ser entonces cancelados, y hay gastos especiales como el pago de décimos sueldos, al mismo tiempo que el flujo de ingresos es relativamente menor (porque por ejemplo el Impuesto a la Renta se cobra en Marzo y Abril, y los anticipos hacia el tercer trimestre). En consecuencia no sabemos si el elevado déficit fiscal es por el ciclo político o por la tendencia normal.  
Dos, el déficit fiscal ha ido aumentando con regularidad en los últimos años independientemente de la situación electoral.
Tres, en general los últimos 10 años fueron de un muy buen entorno para el fisco, salvo los dos shocks externos (de finales 2008 a mediados 2009, y de finales 2014 a finales 2016).
Sin embargo, vale señalar que los déficits antes de las elecciones del 2009 y 2017 están entre los 3 más altos del período, y el déficit antes de la elección del 2013 es bastante mayor que el de los 2 años anteriores…quizás ahí hay algún indicio de un ciclo político.
…sin duda es un tema que requiere mayor reflexión.